¿Ahora quién abrirá los datos públicos?

The recent constitutional reform that dismantled the INAI fundamentally alters Mexico’s transparency framework by replacing an autonomous, independent body with eighteen distinct internal control units across the legislative, judicial, and autonomous sectors. This structural fragmentation disperses oversight responsibilities among entities that originally lack transparency as their primary mandate, raising significant concerns about institutional capacity and focus. The shift implies a systemic weakening of access to information protections, as specialized expertise is diluted among organizations whose core functions differ from safeguarding citizens' rights to data. Most critically, this new arrangement creates an inherent conflict of interest, effectively turning authorities into both regulators and regulated parties. By delegating oversight to internal control units within the same institutions they monitor, the system compromises impartiality, as these bodies depend administratively and budgetarily on the very entities they are tasked with reviewing. This "judge and party" dynamic threatens to undermine the fairness of dispute resolutions, as reviewers may hesitate to challenge decisions made by their own organizational peers, thereby eroding public trust in the accountability mechanisms. This development is highly relevant to open data advocates because it signals a regression from robust, independent oversight to fragmented, internal compliance. The loss of a unified, autonomous guarantor removes a critical check on government power, making it harder for citizens to secure information and hold authorities accountable. Consequently, the reliability and enforceability of open data rights are significantly diminished, requiring greater vigilance from civil society to mitigate the risks of reduced transparency and increased opacity in public administration.

Source: planoinformativo.com
Published on 2025-04-21

¿Ahora quién abrirá los datos públicos?

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